The EU-SDGN Pre-Election Assessment Report on Anambra Governorship Election 2025

The EU-SDGN Pre-Election Assessment Report on Anambra Governorship Election 2025

Media briefing and Presentation of Joint EU-SDGN II Partners’ Pre-Election Assessment Report on the 2025 Anambra State Off-cycle Governorship Election held at Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja-Nigeria on Thursday, October 2025. Introduction & background On behalf of the 16 civil society organisations working as partners under the European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria Phase

Media briefing and Presentation of Joint EU-SDGN II Partners’ Pre-Election Assessment Report on the 2025 Anambra State Off-cycle Governorship Election held at Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja-Nigeria on Thursday, October 2025.

  1. Introduction & background

On behalf of the 16 civil society organisations working as partners under the European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria Phase Two (EU-SDGNII) programme, to advance the country’s democracy, we warmly welcome you to this media briefing convened to present the pre-election assessment report on next week’s off-cycle governorship election in Anambra State.

The conduct of the assessment by the EU’s flagship programme is consistent with the mission of taking actions and engaging in activities that reinforce efforts to promote transparent, credible, peaceful, and inclusive elections. Essentially, the initiative derives from the all-encompassing character of the EU-SDGNII programme with its six components supporting:

  • The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
  • The National Assembly and the Judiciary
  • The Political Parties
  • The Media
  • The Women, Youth, and Persons with Disabilities
  • The Civil Society Organisations

The fact that a cohort of 16 organisations, each with a specific role and focus within the programme, have been working to enhance electoral integrity and foster inclusive political participation serves as evidence of their unwavering commitment to building institutional resilience, as against institutional fragility, and promoting a culture of electoral integrity instead of a tradition of electoral impunity. Although much has been accomplished in this endeavour, it is apparent that we cannot afford to rest on our oars, more so as critical challenges remain for the continuous delivery of credible and acceptable elections.

Against the above background and realising that off-cycle elections could serve as crucial barometers for gauging the readiness of election stakeholders for the next General Elections in 2027, the joint pre-election assessment ahead of the Anambra State Governorship Election scheduled for Saturday, 8 November 2025, was undertaken to:

  1. Review the electoral environment.
  2. Identify the emerging risks, opportunities, and mitigation priorities; and
  3. Support proactive responses by stakeholders before election day.

The Pre-Election Assessment Report covers the period between June and September 2025. Employing a rigorous mixed-methods approach, four complementary analytical components were used to generate a comprehensive picture of the pre-election landscape incorporating:

  • Context Analysis: mapping political, social, and security dynamics;
  • Media Landscape Analysis: tracking threats to journalists and media freedom;
  • Gender Assessment: evaluating women’s participation and inclusion; and
  • Disability Inclusion Assessment: assessing accessibility and participation of Persons with Disabilities (PWDs).

Findings from these four assessments were validated and enriched through consultations and engagement with other stakeholders, ensuring that the report reflects diverse perspectives and verifiable evidence. These were reinforced with clustered stakeholder engagements and peer review validation meetings to ensure evidence-driven conclusions.

  1. Key Findings, Progress & Concerns

The key findings from the pre-election assessment have been disaggregated according to the six priority themes of the socio-political context, the security risk landscape, the preparedness by the election management body, media landscape and press freedom, gender participation and disability inclusion.

The findings and some of the lingering concerns over them are:

  1. Sociopolitical Context
  • Anambra has a history of exciting but sometimes violent political contestation
  • There is currently a highly competitive gubernatorial race involving APGA, PDP, APC, and Labour Party, with fluid alliances
  • The August 2025 by-election violence underscored the fragility of electoral infrastructure
  • Youth mobilisation is increasing online, but not reliably translating into polling-unit participation.

Concerns include:

  • Persistent voter apathy. It should be recalled that the turnout in 2021, at 2% 2021 remains Nigeria’s lowest
  • Vote-buying amidst widespread youth distrust of formal politics
  • Restriction of civic and campaign activities by insecurity
  1. Security Risk Landscape
  • Insecurity remains critical across the three zones of:
    Anambra South: Deemed to be the epicentre of cult violence, kidnappings, and ballot snatching
    Anambra Central: Arising from disinformation, elite power struggle, youth gang mobilisation
    Anambra North: Persistent land/resource conflicts, flooding disruptions

Concerns include:

  • The misuse of vigilante groups and continuing attacks on candidates.
  • Fear and restricted movement further suppress turnout.
  • There are clear gaps between coordinated security deployment and early-warning response.
  1. Electoral Preparedness — INEC Performance

– There is progress in registration with over 168,000 newly registered voters recorded and mostly women and youth

– CVR improvement measures are also welcome

Concerns include:

  • 73% of polling units historically open late;
  • Persistent operational and logistics failures with BVAS and IReV;
  • PWD accessibility barriers;
  • Generally, transitioning plans into field efficiency.
  1. Media Landscape and Press Freedom

– The Anambra media landscape is dynamic; media hubs exist outside the state capital while there is diversity of ownership by political, business and religious interests.

Concerns include:

  • Journalists facing harassment, intimidation, and surveillance.
  • Restricted access to campaign events in high-risk LGAs;
  • Limited institutional support when equipment is seized or reporting is disrupted. 
  1. Gender Participation

– Anambra has a progressive history of women’s leadership, even if inclusion remains inadequate.

– Only 2 of 16 parties are fielding female gubernatorial candidates

Concerns include:

  • Women facing online abuse, discriminatory party structures, and safety threat;
  • Largely gender-blind media coverage
  1. Disability Inclusion

– A measure of progress is that 86% of surveyed PWD voters have collected PVCs

Concerns include:

  • Polling stations remaining physically inaccessible;
  • Limited assistive tools and mobility support;
  • Vulnerability of PWDs to insecurity.

 

  1. Preliminary conclusions and proposed urgent next steps:

The pre-assessment report arrived at a number of preliminary conclusions in relation to the thematic areas covered, the observed progress and the highlighted concerns. It outlines important next steps by INEC, the political parties, the security agencies, the media, the civil society organisations, etc., towards enhancing the prospect for a peaceful, inclusive and non-violent 2025 Anambra election.

Among these are:

  • Enforcing strict penalties for vote buying with security agencies and INEC officials being more proactive in detecting and apprehending offenders during the on-going campaigns and on election day. Additionally, widespread multistakeholder initiatives should be launched across communities, market places and youth groups, entailing the use of local languages and emphasising the illegality and detrimental effects of vote buying.
  • Increasing visibility of the police and security personnel during campaign activities to deter intimidation and at sensitive polling units on election day. Alongside is the imperative of swift prosecution of individuals and groups engaging in intimidation, ensuring that offenders face commensurate sanctions and deployment of specialized rapid response teams to volatile LGAs.
  • Deploying election observers and security personnel to monitor and prevent voter suppression tactics, such as intimidation, ballot obstruction, or displacement with the establishment of accessible channels for voters to report suppression or disenfranchisement following wish there should be prompt investigation and redress.
  • Strengthening of election logistics to ensure timely delivery of materials, building on recent positive experiences and lessons learnt from the August bye-elections.
  • Excluding non-statutory security outfits (e.g., vigilantes) from election security roles while reinforcing police neutrality and professionalism.
  • Promoting responsible journalism that upholds ethical standards; discourage sensationalism and partisan reporting.
  • Establishing a Media-Security Desk at the state level, with clear communication lines to provide accredited journalists safe access to polling units and collation centres with INEC ensuring timely issuance of accreditation tags to journalists, with recognition by all security operatives and political stakeholders.
  • Establishing real-time election-day verification desks to debunk fake news, deepfakes, and premature result announcements while INEC should publish timely data and facilitate direct press briefings to curb speculation and disinformation.
  • Ensuring adequate gender representation in the deployment and mobilisation of electoral officers, with at least one female official per polling unit while regularly publish gender-disaggregated data on voter registration, accreditation, turnout, and candidacy to ensure transparency and evidence-based advocacy.
  • Strengthening the role of Gender Desk Officers across state and LGA offices, equipping them with the resources and training to monitor women’s participation and flag gender-related incidents in real time.
  • Aligning campaign messaging with voters’ top concerns—security, jobs, and healthcare—while enhancing visibility of female candidates and ensuring inclusivity within campaign structures to reflect electorate expectations
  • Auditing and upgrading all polling and registration centres for physical accessibility (ramps, tactile paths, lowered tables) while ensuring sufficient assistive devices (braille guides, magnify glasses, sign language interpreters, large-print guides, Form EC40H, etc.) are distributed statewide, including rural areas.
  • Training of all election officials and ad hoc staff on Section 54 of the Electoral Act (2022) regarding the rights of PWDs and issuing clear guidance on priority voting and accommodations (mobility aids, companions, flexible queuing).

 

  1. Key recommendations:

Ladies and gentlemen of the press. In order to further emphasise the role of various stakeholders in internalising the findings and taking actions especially pursuant to the preliminary conclusions and proposed next steps, the Anambra pre-election assessment report actually contains a total of 66 actionable recommendations covering: Electoral offences and justice systems; INEC preparedness and logistics; Security coordination and voter protection; press freedom and responsible information flow; women’s political participation and accessibility and inclusion for PWDs.

 

We will at this juncture be inviting representatives of the EU-SDGNII cohort here present to provide further context and expatiate the recommendations before taking your questions and comments.

As they prepare to do so, it is worth stressing that the credibility of the Anambra election will be judged not only by votes counted, but by all who wish to vote and are enabled to vote. While we affirm our hope that Anambra will deliver on peaceful and credible election, we demand that promises must now become tangible results.

Now to the recommendations:

 

ELECTORAL OFFENCES

No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Strengthen enforcement of Legal Frameworks: Enforce strict penalties for vote buying by ensuring that electoral laws clearly define and penalize such practices. Increase the capacity of security agencies and INEC officials to detect and apprehend offenders during campaigns and on election day. INEC, Security agencies, EFCC
2 Security agencies and INEC officials should be more proactive in detecting and apprehending offenders during campaigns and on election day. Security agencies, INEC

 

ELECTORAL PREPAREDNESS

No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Strengthen election logistics to ensure timely delivery of materials, building on recent positive experiences and lessons learnt from the August bye-elections INEC
2 Expand/sustain voter education campaigns emphasizing the importance of voting, dissuading vote-buying, and countering misinformation, especially via social media. INEC, CSOs

 

ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Exclude non-statutory security outfits (e.g., vigilantes) from election security roles; reinforce police neutrality and professionalism. Security agencies
2 Deploy sufficient, well-trained personnel committed to impartiality. Security agencies
3 Establish clear protocols to prevent infiltration or misuse of non-conventional security groups, such as vigilante or state-sponsored outfits. Security agencies

 

MEDIA FREEDOM
No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Promote responsible journalism that upholds ethical standards; discourage sensationalism and partisan reporting Media actors, CSOs
2 Security Deployment & Collaboration: INEC, the Nigeria Police, DSS, and other security agencies should establish a Media-Security Desk at the state level, with clear communication lines to provide accredited journalists safe access to polling units and collation centres. INEC, Security agencies

 

 

GENDER AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION
No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Integrate gender-sensitive protocols into election security operations, ensuring that female voters and candidates are not disproportionately exposed to intimidation or violence. Security agencies
2 Strengthen the role of Gender Desk Officers across state and LGA offices, equipping them with the resources and training to monitor women’s participation and flag gender-related incidents in real time. INEC

DISABILITY INCLUSION

No. RECOMMENDATION RESPONSIBLE ACTORS
1 Ensure sufficient assistive devices (braille guides, magnify glasses, sign language interpreters, large-print guides, Form EC40H, etc. ) are distributed statewide, including rural areas. INEC
2 Train all election officials and ad hoc staff on Section 54 of the Electoral Act (2022) regarding the rights of PWDs. INEC

I thank you for your attention.

For: EU-SDGN implementing partners

 

 

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