2027 Elections: Beyond the Ballot Summit Communiqué Recommends Strategies to Combat Misinformation, Disinformation, FIMI
Against the backdrop of increasing misinformation, disinformation, AI-generated content, and foreign interference, the summit focused on developing strategies to protect electoral information...
Against the backdrop of increasing misinformation, disinformation, AI-generated content, and foreign interference, the summit focused on developing strategies to protect electoral information integrity in Nigeria in preparation for the 2027 elections.
The National Summit on AI, FIMI, and Electoral Information Integrity, themed ‘Beyond the Ballot: Safeguarding Electoral Information Integrity in the Age of AI,’ examined threats to Nigeria’s electoral information environment ahead of the 2027 general elections.
The summit took place November 2-3, 2026, in Abuja, organised by IPC, CEMESO, International IDEA, DAI, and with EU support. It brought together representatives of electoral institutions, government agencies, regulatory bodies, security organisations, political parties, telecommunications operators, media organisations, technology companies, civil society organisations, fact-checking organisations, academia and international development partners.
Speakers and contributors included the former Chairman of INEC, Prof. Attahiru Jega; the European Union Ambassador to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Mr. Gautier Magnot; INEC Chairman, Prof. Joash Amupitan; the Minister of Information and National Orientation, Alhaji Mohammed Ibrahim Idris (represented by Dr. Dili Ezugah, Executive Secretary of the Nigeria Press Council); Prof. Abigail Ogwezzy-Ndisika, Director of the Institute of Continuing Education, University of Lagos (keynote speaker); Prof. Umaru Pate, former Vice-Chancellor of the Federal University, Kashere; Elonnai Hickok, Managing Director, Global Network Initiative (GNI); and Mr. Kunle Adebajo, Editor, African Academy for Open Source Investigations.
The summit focused on threats such as misinformation, AI-enabled deception, foreign manipulation, and disinformation during elections. It also discussed threats to electoral information integrity and stakeholder responsibilities; security agencies’ roles and accountability in detecting foreign and domestic manipulation; the impact of disinformation on women’s political participation; and media resource limitations.
It also discussed challenges in protecting voting and results processes from manipulation; balancing misinformation control with rights such as freedom of expression and media freedom; and cross-border risks that require international cooperation.
Key Observations
- Electoral information integrity is fundamental to democratic credibility: The credibility of elections depends not only on the credibility of voting and result management processes but also on the accuracy and reliability of information available to citizens before, during and after elections. False information can undermine public confidence in elections even where voting procedures are unaffected.
- Misinformation and disinformation constitute growing threats to Nigeria’s electoral process: The circulation of false political claims, fabricated announcements, manipulated photographs, videos and false or misleading claims about election results presents significant challenges to voter confidence, public participation and institutional credibility. The experience of the 2023 general elections demonstrated the speed at which false information can spread across digital platforms.
- Artificial intelligence presents both opportunities and risks for electoral information integrity: AI can support translation, accessibility, and the timely provision of electoral information. However, generative AI also facilitates deceptive impersonation, fabricated announcements, and manipulated audiovisual content. Responses should address the accuracy, authenticity, and potential harm of content without assuming that all AI-generated material is false or that all deceptive content is AI-generated.
- Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference is an emerging concern: Information manipulation is not restricted to domestic political actors. Foreign networks and coordinated influence operations can exploit existing political, religious, ethnic, and social divisions to amplify narratives, influence public opinion, and undermine national sovereignty. Addressing these threats requires credible evidence, technical expertise, and international cooperation. Assessments should distinguish domestic manipulation, cross-border circulation, and operations with an evidenced foreign connection. Foreign involvement should not be presumed.
- Nigeria’s institutional response requires stronger coordination: Although institutions such as INEC, regulatory agencies, security organisations, media support groups, civil society, and fact-checking bodies have initiated measures to address information threats, gaps remain in coordinated verification, escalation, communication, and incident management, since no single institution can address all these challenges independently.
- Telecommunications operators, digital platforms, and influencers have significant responsibilities: Network operators, social media influencers, and content creators play important roles in shaping public perceptions and facilitating information circulation. Their responsibilities extend beyond service delivery and audience engagement to include infrastructure protection, responsible content dissemination, information verification and the avoidance of content that promotes electoral misinformation.
- Regulatory institutions have capacity gaps in addressing emerging digital challenges: Existing regulatory frameworks and monitoring mechanisms require regular review in the light of technological developments and changes in digital communication. Regulators need appropriate technical expertise, monitoring tools and institutional partnerships to assess suspected manipulation and respond within their statutory mandates and applicable human rights safeguards.
- Media organisations remain central to protecting electoral information integrity but lack resources: Whereas the media have a responsibility to provide accurate, balanced and timely electoral information, resource constraints, limited fact-checking capacity, the increasing use of AI-generated content, limited access to technical expertise and inadequate safeguards against unverified sponsored content can weaken newsroom responses to manipulation.
- Clear Procedures and independent verification are essential to results information integrity: Clear explanations of voting, counting, collation, and declaration procedures, supported by accessible official information and preserved records, help citizens distinguish verified results from unofficial claims. Digital tools should support transparency without obscuring procedural responsibilities or the status of published information.
- Women face disproportionate information-related threats to political participation: Women in politics and public life are particularly exposed to online harassment, impersonation, sexualised attacks, manipulated images, intimidation, and gender-based disinformation. These practices discourage participation, promote self-censorship, and reinforce structural barriers to women’s political representation and leadership.
- Electoral information integrity must be protected without compromising fundamental rights: Measures to address misinformation and disinformation must respect freedom of expression, media freedom, privacy, due process, and legitimate political disagreement. Arbitrary internet shutdowns, indiscriminate platform restrictions, and censorship of independent journalism are inconsistent with a rights-respecting approach to electoral information protection. The inconsistency also reflects in gagging campaigns through the high cost of erecting billboards and unequal media access affecting opposition parties, a factor encouraging the rise in the use of alternative media that are prone to disinformation.
- International and multi-stakeholder cooperation is indispensable: The cross-border nature of digital information manipulation requires cooperation among national institutions, international partners, technology companies, media organisations, civil society, research institutions, and security agencies. Such partnerships must respect national sovereignty, human rights, professional autonomy, and the statutory independence of participating institutions. Sequel to the key observations, the Summit recommended the following priority actions:
Key Takeaways from the Summit Include:
- Electoral information integrity is vital for democratic legitimacy.
- Misinformation and disinformation undermine voter confidence and public participation.
- AI offers benefits but also facilitates deception, including deepfakes and fabricated content.
- Foreign interference exploits social divisions, but credible evidence and cooperation are essential.
- Nigeria’s institutions need improved coordination, verification, and incident management.
- Digital platforms, media, influencers, and telecoms have significant roles in content verification and responsible dissemination.
- Regulatory frameworks require updating, new technical capacities, and safeguards.
- Media organisations face resource constraints hindering effective fact-checking.
- Clear procedures and independent verification are critical for accurate election results.
- Women are disproportionately targeted online, threatening their political participation.
- Policy measures must respect fundamental rights and avoid censorship or restrictions that exacerbate misinformation.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
- Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
Establish a functional, real-time verification system linking INEC information officers with independent fact-checking organisations and relevant media institutions to authenticate suspicious electoral information and issue timely clarifications.
Strengthen the Commission’s technical and human capacity to identify AI-generated audio, deepfake videos, fabricated electoral notices, forged result sheets, manipulated voter records and other forms of synthetic electoral content.
Strengthen the Commission’s capacity to verify electoral information in Nigerian Indigenous languages, including the monitoring of false announcements and fabricated content. audio recordings and manipulated content circulating beyond the major Nigerian languages.
Conduct practical simulations and tabletop exercises involving electoral information threats, including AI-enabled deception, to test the readiness of the Commission’s technical, operational and communication teams ahead of the 2027 general elections.
Strengthen the Commission’s offline and community-based channels for voter information, so that all voters, including those without smartphones, have equitable access to accurate and timely electoral information.
2. National Broadcasting Commission (NBC)
Strengthen regulatory monitoring of election-related content across traditional broadcasting and online platforms to address the changing channels through which electoral misinformation and disinformation are disseminated.
Expand the technical capacity of NBC monitoring officers to assess suspected manipulation in broadcast content, verify sources and seek specialist analysis where necessary.
Strengthen forensic verification capacity through collaboration with Nigeria Internet Registration Agency (NIRA), the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), Big Data organisations and other relevant technical institutions, researchers and independent specialists, within applicable mandates and data protection requirements.
3. Security Agencies
Develop stronger intelligence and investigative capabilities for identifying foreign information manipulation and interference, particularly coordinated operations involving foreign actors, local proxies, paid networks and other non-state actors.
Establish effective inter-agency arrangements for lawful information-sharing and cooperation with national and international partners in investigating suspected unlawful activity associated with coordinated electoral information manipulation.
The Media
Uphold professional standards of accuracy, fairness, editorial independence and verification in reporting election-related developments before, during and after the 2027 general elections, particularly during periods of heightened political tension.
Ensure that headlines, captions, and other forms of presentation accurately reflect verified electoral developments and do not exaggerate or distort information to attract audience engagement.
Strengthen newsroom capacity for identifying and verifying AI-generated images, audio recordings, videos, and other manipulated digital content before publication.
6. Social Media Influencers and Content Creators
Verify information and cross-check facts before publishing or sharing election-related content, recognising the potential consequences of misleading information circulated to large audiences.
Take responsibility for published content by acknowledging errors, issuing timely and visible corrections, and updating misleading material already disseminated. Establish networks of multilingual content creators to identify emerging false narratives, exchange verified information and respond promptly to misleading electoral content.
7. Media support groups, Civil Society Organisations and Fact-Checking Organisations
Establish and strengthen independent monitoring mechanisms for identifying, documenting and challenging electoral misinformation, disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference.
Develop sustained public education programmes on information manipulation, AI-generated content, deepfakes and the importance of verifying information before sharing, particularly in rural and underserved communities.
Monitor and document harmful information targeting women in politics, including impersonation, fabricated content, sexualised attacks and coordinated online harassment.
Support independent research, evidence gathering and threat assessments to inform institutional preparedness and responses to electoral information manipulation.
- Political Parties
Establish and enforce internal standards prohibiting candidates, party officials, campaign teams and supporters from creating or disseminating false electoral information, including AI-generated manipulated content and other forms of technology-driven false electoral information.
Investigate deceptive conduct by persons acting under a party’s authority or sponsorship and take appropriate corrective action and reasonable steps to discourage and correct misinformation circulated by supporters. Ensure that commitments against electoral disinformation and harmful online conduct are supported by enforceable party-level policies or measures rather than treated as symbolic declarations.
Recommendations
- INEC should institutionalise a real-time electoral information verification protocol and enhance AI content detection.
- Tech platforms and telecoms must partner with authorities to address disinformation and improve access.
- Security agencies should enhance intelligence on foreign interference and coordinate investigations.
- Media should uphold accuracy standards, verify content, and avoid sensationalism.
- Influencers and civil society to verify content, promote media literacy, and monitor harmful content targeting women.
- Political parties must establish internal disinformation policies and investigate deceptive conduct.
- Protect women’s political participation through legal and institutional support.
- Youth groups should champion credible information, digital literacy, verification networks, and responsible online conduct.
- Accessibility for persons with disabilities must be integrated into electoral communication.
Concluding Points
- The summit emphasises a coordinated, rights-respecting response to protect electoral information integrity.
- Stakeholders are urged to translate recommendations into measurable actions before the 2027 elections.



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